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Notes re: constitution

Wes Jones

Form is truly bounded only by the limits of dimension. Why do we invent so
narrowly from this infinitude?
We avoid those forms which, in their
alien-ness, point to an infinitude of
possibility that contrasts so with our
own "limited" condition. They are the
un-familiar which witness our mortality. We also avoid those (other) forms
which, in their indifference, reflect the
infinitude of sameness that too strongly
limits our own condition They are the
too familiar which make our mortality
interminable. We "are" on the edge between these two-this is where we like
our form. Apart from some voyeuristic
intrigue which does not sustain us, we
are really only interested in what we
can know, what we might already suspect, what is an extension of ourselves.
It is only here at this edge that we may
"find" meaning. Though meaning depends on the difference which it crosses, it can only reach the "other side" if
there is another side, and it is somehow
not. In this sense the alien is interesting only for the critical contrast it provides which highlights the mechanism
of meaning and its necessary constraints. In fact, this constrained world
of expectation can be seen as an external mapping of our selves, a record of
the inhibitions that define us as what
we may know-and as other than the
other we fear.
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This is the context in which the idea of
constitution has the greatest effect:
"constitution" is ultimately the estab-

lishment of a bulwark of constraint
against otherness. It sets out the frontiers of meaning, it provides difference
with a certain resolution. To constitute
is to create, out and away from limitless
possibility, a position which marginalizes and then eliminates real otherness;
to constitute is to set up and maintain a
world, here, despite the other, there.
A call for re-constitution suggests that
the constraining limits are wearing
out and that otherness is seeping
through. To some this possibility is to
be celebrated as a means to greater
freedom. They seek only (de-con)stitution. Others see this as anarchy and
bemoan the loss of meaning in the
world, proposing re-constitution. Still
others mourn this loss, but distrust attempts to rehydrate versions of the
original and prefer to imagine that a
new constitution could be written.
By setting up and maintaining a distinct, knowable world the constitutional act provides the comfort and
certainty of familiarity. The constitutional act carries, or manufactures, a
sense of inevitability. We speak of it
as natural. It gives us conviction
about the order of things that might
have given rise to it. The reference to
naturalness is not accidental or casual.
The " naturalness " of that act is the
sign of its connection to the ultimate
authority, nature. Ironically, of course,
nature is itself the other. It is the entire reservoir of possibility. Yet, it becomes foundational because it must:
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unlike everything else to which possibiliry, Nature could not be otherwise.
It simply is what is . It always provides
a backstop to meaning, an answer to
difference. In a final desperate act to
defeat otherness we give ourselves
over to this larger inevitability, Nature. We find comfort in this inevitability; it is our only recourse to
certainty. Architecture in particular
has followed this principle and drawn
its form from this source-since ultimately it is the only source. The constitutional act particularizes this general
inevitability, giving it a human face.

First Fwor Plan

Site Plan

As an assurance of "uniqueness," and
"priority," inevitability gives value to
originality. The idea of Origin is the
means by which we approximate Nature's inevitability. Nature is first of
all: prior to all meaning. Priority confers legitimacy to the constitutional
activity which generates first meaning,
rendering that meaning inevitable.
When originality is established, inevitability follows ; when the inevitability is sensed, origin is expected.
Yet, to "set-up or establish" supposes
"in the first place" a prior lack. If the
authority of this establishment depends on its irreducibility, then awareness of this former lack only serves to
undermine the inevitability of that authority. Those who celebrate de-constitution revel in the provisionality of
this initial establishment, and its axiomatic nature.
The idea of the axiom answers the
dilemma of beginning: if ex nihilo,
nihil fit, then there must already be a
something with which to begin. The
axiomatic beginning is found in "selfevidence": the chain of reduction that
arrives at the axiom compels the axiom to be the limit, and thus the beginning, because it hasn' t the perspective to question the questioning-leaving the axiom as so basic
within the system that it must be "beyond proof." The standard of proof,
legislated by the pre-existing system
that the axiom is created to found,

thus negatively defines its relationship
to its most basic eleme~t. From the
provisional origin then proceeds a
post-rationalized evolution which miraculously explains the context that
legislated the axiom. Given that context, the intention behind these efforts disappears into "nature," and
with it the "post-" which undermines
the rationalization by remembering
its provisionality. Like the sand in the
oyster or Laugier's primitive hut, the
axiom is necessary to begin the process,
but, if the process succeeds, it is swallowed during its course and disappears
into the inevitability of the product.
(Pamphlet Architecture 12, Building;
Machines)
The axiom intends to convince us that
before the beginning is nothing, nothing that need concern us, but the deconstitutionists spoil it to remind us
that after the end is forever. If the authority that seems inevitable is shown
to be motivated, or if the anchors we
depend on for security are shown to
be restraints founded on nothing more
substantial than whatever first came
to mind, then we should be free to invent or dismiss either, forever. While
beginning may seem to be as far away
from the End as possible, and as free
from infinitude as could be imagined-and while an obsession with its
clarity would seem to be proof against
fear and uncertainty, it is also the beginning which gives to time its sinister direction.
Re-constitution calls into question the
absoluteness of time as a datum.
When the beginning recedes too far in
the memory-perhaps when the end
is more palpable-we consider reviving the beginning. Not a new, or different beginning, which can only
evolve as a response to otherness, bur
the same beginning, again, re-hydrated. In an attempt to re-invigorate its
"present," re-constitution risks trivializing the passage of time which otherwise gives to Architecture its most
basic role as conservator. It strips the
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object of the history that ensnares it
and determines the greatest part of its
meaning. In re-constitution, the clock
is re-set-up. History is emptied of the
relationships and meaning that distinguish it from time.
The call for re-constitution responds
to the desire to feel that particular
"rightness" that marks artifacts of an
authentic constitutional period. The
temporal portability of those objects
which survive from some such a beginning, confuses our understanding
of that datum dividing them from
now. We value the surviving artifacts
as evidence of that history and presume that the rightness they communicate to us now is what they communicated then in their original, "natural context." They become fetishes, focusing our longing for the optimism
or certainty we feel attends constitutional activity. Eventually they come
to substitute for the period they recall,
and we attempt to regain those feelings by replicating those objects.

an authentic constitutional effort today
must arise out of its contemporary context: it cannot be recovered from any
past and be authentic in the present.
Authentic means "genuine. " This suggests a "presentness" or being "in the
moment," yet almost paradoxically,
authenticity is only retroactively understood or credited. Because of this
presentness the truly authentic act
never has the perspective or self-consciousness to be aware of its own authenticity, and certainly not as something to direct its efforts nor can it be
concerned about what might constitute the later determination of that
authenticity. In this respect, authenticity is innocent of its own historicity. If we covet this authenticity we violate its innocence. Consequently, authenticity more often comes to mind
in being questioned: the "genuine" is
valued precisely because of its originality-encouraging the imitations

Yet, such work can really have authentic meaning only in its own, no
longer extent, context. "The works are
no longer the same as they once were.
It is they themselves, to be sure, that
we encounter. .. , but they themselves
are gone by ... Henceforth they remain
merely such objects." (M. Heideggar,
"Origin of the Work of Art"). We can
neither know for sure whether our
present reactions reflect those originally inspired by such objects, nor if
the original reactions themselves are
what we assume.
To recover is to re-COVER-the original condition which is sought is irretrievably lost in time. The survival of
objects, whether through their intrinsic merit, or for their "historical" value,
does not in itself enable a passage
across time or a resetting of the clock.
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In attempting to rekindle the spark of
authenticity from the best stuff of even
the recent past, we fail to realize that
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from which it must distinguish itself
as genuine . Yet, it is precisely when
something is identified as genuine or
"authentic" that suspicions are raised.
Something celebrated as authentic is
almost certainly not, really. It becomes a challenge to the discriminating reader, rather than an assurance .
The clear intentionality of constitutional effort would seem to mitigate its
opportunities for "authenticity." Either innocence or inevitability are foreign to either a heroic or critical conception of constitution. Yet it is toperiods of constitutional activity that we
most often appeal for examples of authenticity-and it is authenticity that
is sought in the call for re-constitution.
Between the innocence and timeliness
that is retrospectively seen in an authentic object, shines the willfulness
which grounds the object in its own
time and context. The fervor of this

will ensures a certain innocence, its
directedness ensures a certain timeliness. While this prevents the significant translation of this work, itself, to
other times, it ensures the continuing
emergence of new constitutional acts.
This should be cause for hope. It
should mean that the coveted sense of
rightness can be invented or set-up
again. It should mean, then, that we
are not completely prisoners of circumstance, that we can again achieve
that authenticity, willfully, without
h aving to wait around for it to just
happen, or trying to recover or re-animate it from historical artifacts.
The work done during the revolutionary phase of the Modern movement
bootstrapped itself into existence as a
socially aware, formal reaction to the
nostalgia of the nineteenth century. In
this sense, it was hardly innocent or
timely, defining itself directly in terms
of this opposition. It was the product
of the first generation to consciously
express authenticity's embarrassment
by nostalgia. This awareness, however,
did not prevent their participation in
the dynamic and in this lies the real
innocence and topicality that is only
evident in retrospect. Its expressed
neo-constitutive program avoided the
nostalgic trivialization of time by
maintaining the abstraction of any
qualities it attempted to recover from
its past: it sought ideas, not objects;
stories, not forms. Corbu claimed to
be re-covering the clarity of the pastthe elemental nature of certain forms
(Phileban solids) of Roman architecture, and the "terrible" refinement of
the Greek-not the imagery itself.
The modernist formal preoccupation
was unmistakably contemporary.
What today can be authentic? What
today might be a source of innocent
timeliness? Paradoxically, it is the contemporary (hyper) awareness asking
this question which seems to prevent a
satisfying answer. The present estrangement for Architecture's larger
public responsibility is both a result of

this awareness (the false modesty of
avoiding the repressiveness of authority) and the chief impediment to its
evolution. Today's visions, though
they may be adopted generally, as "the
fashion," are for the most part personal. To again "achieve" authenticity,
Architecture 's essential publicness
must turn "innocence" away from the
"personal," and "timeliness" away
from narrow topicality. It must again
fix what is natural for us and what is
other. It must show us the edge where
authentic meaning can be produced.
A concern for what might be the natural thing to do seems lost today within the greater interest in critique. The
gaze is focussed over the edge, outward, rather than along it. Interest in
this frontier is taken by and as critique
to be a license to doubt, rather than
assure. The limits are seen as barriers
to us, rather than to otherness, and the
cry is out to destroy them. The architect is expected to go over the top and
"take a position."
Unfortunately, the position so taken
demonstrates only the plurality which
is anarchitecture. Necessarily a cri-
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rique, it generally assumes the unlikelihood of a larger, continuous vision
that might be expressed by Architecture, instead, by its own example it implies this vision must be posed anew at
every site, as a unique, and most often
highly personal, statement.
In a narrow sense to constitute is itself
to "set-up or establish" a position.
And in a still narrower sense Architecture itself is a "position": architecture
has been established as an area staked
out between Art and utility. Objectively only a statement of intent, the
label "Architecture" covers the a collection of practices filling the space
framed between these two. It intends,
however, much more: to constitute
whatever (necessarily axiomatic) bulwark of certainty that man can find or
declare in the face of Otherness.
To "take a position" regarding this
"position," which any critical or nostalgic Architectural statement implies,
exposes the axiomatic, "positional"
nature of Architecture itself, undermining its usefulness as a constitutional presence. The axiomatic reality
of the constitutional enterprise re-

quires that the position become invisible as a position-if the system that
it builds is to foster any sense of confidence. Neither the nostalgic replication, as unintentional dissimulation, nor the critical pose, as a purposeful un-masking activity, ever recede into the systems they sponsor.
Such activity cannot pretend to the
sort of universal validity that constitutional efforts assume for themselves .
When its genesis is so obviously
"questionable, " the object must always appear sheepish. Such activity
says "look at me"-it asks the viewer
to see the building as an expression of
the Architect's will. Architecture, on
the other hand, says "see yourselves,
writ large, in me"-throughout the
building it expresses society's will and
the nature of things.
This is not to say that Architects cannot be strong willed . When the will
is linked to that of the larger public, it
becomes magnified: the utopian visions ofLe Corbusier and Wright amplified the willfullness of their Architecture without compromising its
originality or authorship. Indeed, it
was by attending to a larger vision of

society that they were given the drive
to find the new forms which forced
back the limiting otherness.
Architecture is never truly innocent,
otherwise it would be building. It is
never timely or it would not endure.
Yet, Architecture's proper goal is still
authenticity, but understood as the
ever-frustrated dream of these, predicted in the present to be read in the
future. Because Architecture seeks authenticity, it has often been a site of
nostalgia. If Architecture's proper goal
is the authentic, the timeliness of our
own understanding of this term must
include the modesty which realizes
that it is achievable only in retrospect.

Illustrated is Holt Hinshaw jones ' competition entry for the Mariana Kistler Beach
Art Museum at Kansas State University.
The Project team was Tony Duncan,
Michael Gough, jean Young jones, Wes
jones, and Bob Shepherd.
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